The Constitutionality of Federal Anti-Literacy Test Legislation by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1962
The Constitutionality of Federal Anti-Literacy Test
Legislation
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "The Constitutionality of Federal Anti-Literacy Test Legislation" (1962). Minnesota Law Review. 2782.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2782
1076
The Constitutionality of Federal
Anti-Literacy Test Legislation
Anti-literacy test legislation has been proposed to the
Congress during its current session. This proposed legis-
lation raises important constitutional questions concern-
ing the power of Congress to limit the power of the states
to establish qualifications for voters. The author of this
Note examines this legislation and suggests possible con-
stitutional bases. He concludes that the primary consti-
tutional support for federal limitations is under the en-
forcement clause of the fifteenth amendment.
INTRODUCTION
"What do we mean by the U.N.?" "Who is in charge of street
improvements in Birmingham?" "What is meant by a legal resi-
dent of Virginia?" "When is the payment of the poll tax not re-
quired?" "What are the requisites necessary for registration in Vir-
ginia?" These were some of the questions asked prospective voters
as they were given literacy tests in their various states.' As the
questions fairly indicate, some had difficulty passing. Most were
Negroes. Not even educated Negroes could meet the challenge.
One, a graduate of Harvard, was asked to read from the Bible,
the Constitution, and finally from texts written in Latin and Greek.
He did so successively. Exasperated, the registrar handed him a
laundry ticket written entirely in Chinese and asked, "now, dog-
gone ye, what does that mean?" "It means," said the Negro
graduate, "that you white folks are not going to let me vote."2
In an effort to prevent such discrimination in the application of
literacy tests, two bills have been introduced in Congress making
it unlawful to require anyone who has completed a sixth grade
education to take a literacy test as a qualification for voting. The
Administration bill, proposed by Senator Mansfield, applies only
to federal elections, while the other bill, introduced by Senator
1. Note, Use of Literacy Tests to Restrict the Right to Vote, 31 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 251, 259 (1956), citing KEY, SOUTHERN POLrrIcs 572 n.22(1949) & MYRDAL, 1 AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 485 (1944).
2. EMBREE, BROWN AMEaIC-A s 144 (1943). Perhaps even more unan-
swerable was this question put to a Negro Ph.D.: "How many bubbles are
there in a bar of soap?" His reply, "What kind of soap?" proved un-
availing. Verney, The American Negro, 26 POL. Q. 128, 130 (1955).
NOTES
Javits, applies to all elections, federal and state.3 Because the
states have traditionally exercised the power expressly given them
by the Constitution to establish qualifications for voters,4 the as-
sertion of power by Congress to eliminate a state test of voter
qualification raises important constitutional questions.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the constitutionality of
the proposed legislation by examining the various provisions of the
Constitution under which these bills could be justified.
I. NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Because both article I, section 2 and the seventeenth amendment
provide that the qualifications for voters in congressional elections
shall be the same as those established by the states for voters in
3. The Administration bill provides:
No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall
intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or
coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the
right of such person to vote or to vote as he may choose in any
Federal election, or subject or attempt to subject any other person to
the deprivation of the right to vote in any Federal election. "De-
privation of the right to vote" shall include but shall not be limited
to (1) the application to any person of standards or procedures more
stringent than are applied to others similarly situated and (2) the de-
nial to any person otherwise qualified by law of the right to vote on
account of his performance in any examination, whether for liter-
acy or otherwise, if such other person has not been adjudged incom-
petent and has completed the sixth primary grade of any public
school or accredited private school in any State or territory, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
"Federal election" means any general, special, or primary election
held solely or in part for the purpose of electing or selecting any can-
didate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector,
Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives,
Delegate, or Commissioner from the territories or possessions.
S. 2750, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
The Javits bill provides:
All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by
law to vote at any election by the people in any State, territory, dis-
trict, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or
other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all
such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude, and without subjection to any arbitrary or unreason-
able test, standard, or practice with respect to literacy; any constitu-
tion, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or territory, or
by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding. "Arbitrary
or unreasonable test, standard, or practice with respect to literacy"
shall mean any requirement designed to determine literacy, compre-
hension, intelligence, or other test of education, knowledge, or un-
derstanding, in the case of any citizen who has not been adjudged
an incompetent who has completed the sixth primary grade in a school
accredited by any State or by the District of Columbia.
S. 480, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
4. WARREN, THE MAxn'J OF THE CONSTITUTION 399-403 (1928).
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state elections,5 a person has no constitutional right to vote until
he is first qualified by the state.' Thus, voters have been able to
invoke constitutional protection in cases of ballot-box stuffing7 and
irregular vote counting' only because they have already been
qualified to vote by the state. In establishing voter qualifications,
"save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments,
and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may
condition suffrage as it deems appropriate."9 Under this test, the
states have been able to use literacy tests as a condition to voting
for over 60 years without transgressing any constitutional limita-
tions.'o
The constitutionality of federal legislation abolishing a state's
qualifications for voting has never been tested in the courts be-
cause Congress has never enacted such a measure." Fifteen years
ago, however, constitutional issues similar to those presented by
the anti-literacy test proposals were raised when an attempt was
made to have Congress eliminate the poll tax. At that time, several
commentators concluded that anti-poll tax legislation was consti-
tutional because it was not a "qualification" within the meaning
of either article I, section 2 or the seventeenth amendment; there-
fore, Congress need not permit the imposition of a poll tax as a
condition on voting.' However, this analysis does not resolve the
issues raised by the anti-literacy test proposals, for the application
5.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second year by the People of the several States, and
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. The seventeenth amendment contains identical
language concerning the qualifications for voters in Senate elections.
6. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347, 362 (1915); United States v. Crosby, 25 Fed. Cas.
701, 704 (No. 14893) (C.C.S.C. 1871).
7. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
8. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
9. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937).
10. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959);
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213 (1898). In Guinn the Court commented that
no time need be spent on the question of the validity of the liter-
acy test considered alone since as we have seen its establishment was
but the exercise by the State of a lawful power vested in it not sub-
ject to our supervision, and indeed, its validity is admitted.
238 U.S. at 366.
11. During the Second World War Congress passed anti-poll tax legisla-
tion prohibiting the collection of poll taxes from servicemen during time
of war, 56 Stat. 753 (1942), but the constitutionality of this statute was
never litigated. The measure has been repealed. 69 Stat. 589 (1955).
12. Christensen, The Constitutionality of National Anti-Poll Tax Bills,
33 MINN. L. REV. 217 (1949); Kallenbach, Constitutional Aspects of
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of a literacy test is a direct attempt to determine a person's quali-
fication to vote.
Yet the power of the states to establish voter qualifications does
not necessarily preclude Congress from regulating the exercise
of that power. The fifteenth amendment, for example, specifically
grants Congress the power to prohibit the states from disqualify-
ing voters on the basis of race or color.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR ANTI-
LITERACY TEST LEGISLATION
A. THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
The fifteenth amendment provides that the right to vote "shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." It also
gives Congress the power to enforce the amendment by "appropri-
ate legislation."
This amendment is clearly phrased as a limitation on state or
federal action. Whenever a person is denied the right to vote on
account of race or color, not only may relief be sought in the
courts, but also Congress may enact "appropriate legislation" to
prevent such discrimination. Congress may exercise this power
only when state or federal action actually interferes with the amend-
ment's guarantees. 3
Although by its terms the fifteenth amendment does not confer
the right to vote on anyone, it may have that effect. For example,
if a state were to restrict its electorate to white persons, the fifteenth
amendment, by prohibiting this qualification, would extend the
right to nonwhites. But this does not mean that the fifteenth
amendment has displaced the states' power to designate voter
qualifications. The amendment only prohibits the states from dis-
qualifying voters because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. It does not purport to eliminate any other qualifications
which a state may choose to impose.
The decisive question in analyzing the constitutionality of the
proposed anti-literacy test legislation under the fifteenth amend-
ment is whether that legislation is "appropriate" within the mean-
ing of the amendment's enforcement clause. This would seem to
require a congressional finding that rights secured by the fifteenth
amendment are being denied through the unfair application of
Federal Anti-Poll Tax Legislation, 45 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1947); Note,
21 N.Y.U.L.Q. 113 (1946).
13. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1915); cf. Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
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state literacy tests. Such a finding should not be difficult to make,
for certainly it is true that literacy tests have been used to keep
Negroes from the polls.' Congress may determine that the only
appropriate way to eliminate the discriminatory application of a
literacy test is to eliminate the test itself. This analysis is sug-
gested by the preambles to both bills. They justify the bills by
pointing out that literacy tests have been used extensively to deny
persons the right to vote because of race or color.
Moreover, what constitutes "appropriate legislation" under the
fifteenth amendment is arguably a political judgment-the type of
judgment which the Supreme Court has said Congress is uniquely
able to make.' 5 While any Negro barred from the polls because
of the discriminatory application of a literacy test may obtain re-
lief in the courts, problems of proof and delays in litigation render
this remedy impractical." If Congress determines that the only
appropriate way to eliminate discriminatory application of liter-
acy tests is to eliminate the tests themselves, then the Supreme
Court should defer to that determination.
Yet countervailing considerations can be urged to show that the
proposed legislation is not "appropriate legislation." In order to be
constitutional, a literacy test must be nondiscriminatory on its
face; thus, it is only the application of the test that is discrimina-
tory. But not all literacy tests have been applied in a discrimina-
tory manner. The present proposals would eliminate the fair as
well as the unfair use of literacy tests. They would prohibit the
states from exercising a power expressly given them by the Con-
stitution-the power to establish a valid literacy test, fairly ad-
ministered, as a means of determining who shall vote. 17
Moreover, the use of the sixth grade classification for deter-
mining those who should be exempt from state literacy tests
seems arbitrary. The corrective commands of the fifteenth amend-
14. See notes 1 & 2 supra and accompanying text.
15.
But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of
Congress to employ necessary means, for the execution of the pow-
ers conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its enumer-
ation of powers is added, that of making "all laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of
the United States, or in any department thereof."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-12 (1819). (Em-
phasis added.)
16. For a discussion of the various remedies available to the voter under
recent civil rights proposals and the difficulties inherent in current law,
see Heyman, Federal Remedies for Voteless Negroes, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
190 (1960); Comment, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 390 (1961).
17. See note 10 supra.
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ment may not authorize a partial remedy. If the reason for en-
acting anti-literacy test legislation is to protect Negroes from dis-
crimination, all literacy tests should be abolished, for it seems
elementary that the "illiterate" Negro who has had only a fifth
grade education is entitled to the same constitutional protection
as the "literate" Negro who has completed six grades. There seems
to be no rational basis for distinguishing between these two voters.
Unfair application of a literacy test is bad whether the applicant
has had no education or has received a graduate degree. Legisla-
tion which divides potential voters into such arbitrary groups in
order to eliminate discrimination common to both may not only be
"inappropriate," but may also contravene the due process pro-
visions of the fifth amendment.
On the other hand, use of the sixth grade classification may be
the only practical remedy, and hence it may provide a rational
basis for this distinction. If anti-literacy test legislation were to ap-
ply to all persons regardless of educational differences, the states
would be precluded from establishing any literacy standards. Un-
der the present proposals, the states retain substantial power to
keep illiterates from voting since it is likely that most persons who
have completed the sixth grade are "literate" and would pass a
valid literacy test, fairly administered. In addition, the evil in the
discriminatory application of a literacy test is that it prevents other-
wise qualified persons from voting. The proposed legislation is
premised on a congressional finding that most persons with a
sixth grade education are likely to be literate and that a state de-
termination that these persons are "illiterate" is probably due to
discrimination. The proposed legislation, therefore, is an attempt
to balance the state's interest in disqualifying illiterate persons
from voting with the federal interest under the fifteenth amend-
ment in preventing state discrimination against literate Negroes.
In balancing these interests, a classification that all persons with a
sixth grade education are literate for voting purposes does not
seem to be without a rational basis.
Thus, the anti-literacy test proposals appear to be constitutional
under the fifteenth amendment.
B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION
As applied to the states' power to establish qualifications for
voters, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
guarantees that the states will not disqualify a voter on the basis
of a test which is arbitrary."8
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "No State shall . . . de-
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The equal protection clause has often been used to invalidate a
state statute which confers "a naked and arbitrary power to give
or withhold consent" even though the statute is nondiscriminatory
on its face.19 Thus, while a state literacy test which requires the
applicant to "understand and explain any article of the constitu-
tion of the United States in the English language" is nondiscrimi-
natory on its face, it violates the equal protection clause because
of the arbitrary power it confers upon the election registrars.20 Not
all literacy tests confer arbitrary power, however, and the Supreme
Court has recently upheld the validity of a test which requires the
applicant to "read and write" any section of the state constitution.2
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress the pow-
er to enforce the amendment by "appropriate legislation." Even if
a literacy test is nondiscriminatory on its face, the discriminatory
application of the test violates the equal protection clause be-
cause voters of different races or colors are treated differently.
Congress may legislate to prevent such discrimination, for there is
little doubt that the registrar's action when he discriminates is the
action of the state even though he is exceeding the authority given
him under an otherwise valid literacy test statute.22 Thus, the
question here is the same as that raised under the fifteenth
amendment-whether the proposed legislation is "appropriate. 23
ny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The equal protection clause permits classifications which are "not arbi-
trary, but [are] based on a real and substantial difference having a rea-
sonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation." Powers Mfg.
Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493 (1927). See also Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (classification need only have "a basis in rea-
son").
19. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886).
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appear-
ance, yet if it is applied and administered by public authority with an
evil eye and an unequal hand . . . the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74.
20. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 877-78 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd mem.,
336 U.S. 933 (1949).
21. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959). The Court distinguished the Davis case as follows: "The great dis-
cretion it vested in the registrar . . was merely a device to make
racial discrimination easy. We cannot make the same inference here." Id.
at 53.
22.
There can be no doubt . . . that Congress has the power to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a
badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, wheth-
er they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
23. The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment
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C. CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROVISIONS
1. Article I, Section 4
By providing that the states may regulate the "manner" of hold-
ing congressional elections while permitting Congress to "make or
alter" such regulations, article I, section 4 confers a legislative
power on Congress which-in contrast to the power to enforce the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments-is not conditioned on the
existence of state action.24 This power extends only to congres-
sional elections; state and presidential elections are beyond its
reach. Congress may therefore regulate the manner of holding
congressional elections as it wishes, and if congressional action
conflicts with state regulation, the supremacy clause of article VI
dictates that the action of Congress will prevail.25
In determining whether the proposed anti-literacy test legisla-
tion derives this limited constitutional support under article I, sec-
tion 4, the basic issue is whether a federal statute exempting cer-
tain persons from state literacy tests is a regulation of the "manner"
of holding an election for Congress. The cases are not clear as to
whether the power to regulate the manner of holding an election
includes the power to abolish state created qualifications for vot-
ers. In Ex parte Siebold,2 0 the manner of holding an election was
held to include the method by which votes were counted. Thus,
Congress had the power to punish state election officials who were
charged with stuffing ballot-boxes in a congressional election. But
this case involved only the rights of qualified voters; it did not
raise the issue of federal control of voter qualifications.
may also serve as a constitutional basis for the bills. However, ever since
the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), this clause has
secured only the rights of citizens of the United States, and not those of
citizens of the states. Thus, the privileges and immunities clause protects
only those rights derived from the Constitution or from federal statutes.
Certainly there is a federal right under the fifteenth amendment to be
free from discrimination in the application of a literacy test, and any state
which uses a literacy test in a discriminatory fashion undoubtedly violates
the privileges and immunities clause. Yet heretofore the Supreme Court
has not accepted the analysis that there is a federal right to vote absent
state qualifications which are valid. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277,
283 (1937). See text accompanying note 6 supra. Once again, the question
is whether it is "appropriate" to eliminate a valid literacy test in order to
prevent recurrence of those instances in which the test has been used un-
fairly.
24. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4 provides in part:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legisla-
ture thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
25. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384 (1879).
26. Ibid.
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Probably the most direct support for the constitutionality of the
proposed legislation under article I, section 4, is the Court's lan-
guage in United States v. Classic that "the states are authorized
by the Constitution, to legislate on [the right to vote] as provided
by § 2 of Art. I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted
state action by the exercise of its powers to regulate elections un-
der § 4 . *.".., Although this language arguably endorses con-
gressional regulation of voter qualifications, it probably should not
be interpreted so broadly. Classic involved charges against state
election officials for falsely counting ballots; only the rights of
qualified voters were at stake, and the Court noted this fact sev-
eral times.
While the language in Classic appears to support congressional
regulation of voter qualifications, Newberry v. United States29 in-
dicates that Congress does not have this power. There the Court
said that the states' power to establish voter qualifications was a
limitation on the power of Congress to regulate the manner of
holding an election.3 On the other hand, this statement was dic-
tum since the issue before the Court was the ability of Congress
to limit campaign expenditures, not its power to abolish qualifica-
tions for voters established by the states.
Thus, the cases do not make it clear that anti-literacy test leg-
islation can be constitutionally supported by article I, section 4. Al-
though the Court has never expressly denied Congress the power
to abolish state voter qualifications under its power to regulate the
"manner" of holding an election, it seems unlikely that the Court
would permit the proposed anti-literacy test legislation to be upheld
on such grounds, for this would, in effect, give Congress the direct
power to establish qualifications for voters-a power not expressly
granted to Congress by the Constitution. Furthermore, this would
contradict not only the well-established view that the Constitution
permits the states to create voter qualifications,3 but also the
clear implications of article I, section 2.32
27. 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
28. "Obviously included within the right to choose, secured by the Con-
stitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots
and have them counted at Congressional elections." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
For similar references, see id. at 307, 310.
29. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
30. Id. at 256.
31. WARREN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 399-403.
32. See note 5 supra. If article I, section 4 does support anti-literacy
test legislation, then a sixth grade classification would be permissible be-
cause it would simply be a qualification for voters established by Congress,
and not corrective legislation designed to prevent discrimination.
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2. Article II, Section 1
The power of Congress to regulate presidential elections differs
radically from its power to regulate congressional elections. Arti-
cle II, section 1 provides that the states may appoint presidential
electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct
. ..." All states choose electors by a general election, and these
electors later elect the President. Congress is not given any express
power to regulate presidential elections other than the power to
establish the day on which the electors shall be chosen, and the
day on which those electors shall choose the President.33 Thus,
nothing in article II, section 1 suggests that Congress has the
power to establish qualifications for electors in presidential elec-
tions, or for the voters who select these electors.
Yet the power of Congress to regulate presidential elections
under this clause may not be as limited as this analysis suggests.
In upholding a federal statute which required presidential cam-
paign committees to report all financial contributions, the Su-
preme Court, in Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, recog-
nized that Congress had the power to protect itself and to pre-
serve the government from "impairment or destruction, whether
threatened by force or corruption."34 As applied to the present
proposals, Congress could find that because literacy tests are be-
ing used to prevent otherwise qualified persons from voting, the
representative character of the federal government is being threat-
ened, and that literacy tests must be abolished altogether in order
to protect against this threat. On the other hand, the Burroughs
decision probably does not authorize federal control over the
qualifications for voters and electors in presidential elections. This
question was not raised by the facts. Thus, neither Burroughs
nor article II, section 1 seem to offer any constitutional support
for anti-literacy test legislation.
3. The Guarantee Clause
The preambles to the Administration bill ("Congress finds
that it is essential to our form of government that all qualified
citizens have the opportunity to participate in the choice of elected
officials"), and to the Javits bill ("Congress finds that the right to
vote is fundamental to free, democratic government . . . .") indi-
cate that Congress may seek to justify anti-literacy test legislation
under the guarantee clause of article IV, section 4. It provides that
33. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
34. 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
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"the United States shall guarantee every state in this Union a Re-
publican Form of Government . .. .
Questions arising under the guarantee clause have usually been
dismissed by the Supreme Court under the "political question!'
doctrine." That doctrine is a rule formulated by the Court where-
by it will not decide certain cases on the merits even though they
involve an interpretation of the Constitution which is necessary to
a decision. The rule is designed to prevent unnecessary conflict be-
tween the Court and other branches of the government, and it is
based on the concept that a final decision in certain cases should
be left to either Congress or the President." Because the Su-
preme Court has said that problems arising under the guarantee
clause "are for the consideration of the Congress and not the
courts,"3 7 if Congress decides that anti-literacy test legislation is
necessary for the maintenance of a republican form of government,
there is a possibility that its decision will not be reviewed.
However, it is doubtful- whether the Court would apply the po-
litical question doctrine to anti-literacy test legislation. Ever since
Marbury v. Madison,3" the Supreme Court has acted as the final
arbiter of congressional legislation. While it is true that the Court
has generally declined to review congressional legislation enacted
under the guarantee clause, it has done so because the claims for
relief in those cases rested only on a deprivation of rights se-
cured by that clause. 9 For example, if legislation deprives a per-
son of his constitutional rights (violations of which are normally
reviewable), the guarantee clause and the "political question" doc-
trine will not be applied to prevent judicial review.4" Since any
challenge to anti-literacy test legislation will undoubtedly involve
35. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937);
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150 (1912).
36. For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see Baker v.
Carr, 82 Sup. Ct. 691, 705-20 (1962); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation,
37 HARv. L. REV. 338 (1924); Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial
Function, 69 Hnv. L. REv. 217, 227-28 (1956); Wechsler, Toward Neu-
tral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1959);
Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. REv. 296 (1925); Comment, 61
COLuM. L. REv. 704, 705-06 (1961); Note, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 292.
37. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74,
80 (1937).
38. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867). See also Baker v. Carr, 82 Sup. Ct.
691, 714 (1962).
40. This distinction was drawn in Baker v. Carr, 82 Sup. Ct. 691 (1962).
Finally, we emphasize that it is the involvement in Guaranty Clause
claims of the elements thought to define "political questions," and
no other feature, which could render them nonjusticiable ..
When challenges to state action . . . have rested on claims of
constitutional deprivation which are amenable to judicial correction,
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constitutional questions under the fifteenth amendment, it will
probably not be dismissed under the "political question" doctrine.
Assuming, then, that the Supreme Court would not uphold the
constitutionality of anti-literacy test legislation merely by refusing
to review it, the issue is whether such legislation is necessary to
preserve a "republican" form of government. To make this deter-
mination, Congress must find that those states which use literacy
tests to disqualify certain voters no longer have republican forms
of government. It seems unlikely that the Court would accept this
determination, for just recently it has declared:
Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet in our society where
newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and
debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who
are literate should exercise the franchise.41
Thus, anti-literacy test legislation seems to derive no constitutional
support from the guarantee clause.
CONCLUSION
Over the past 25 years, the Supreme Court has not been afraid
to reject old concepts, especially as they pertain to the rights of
Negroes. Perhaps the best example is the Court's decision declar-
ing school segregation unconstitutional.42 Another is the line of
decisions frustrating various white primary plans. 43 And just re-
cently, the Court has declared that due process does not require
cross-examination of those who file charges of discrimination with
the Civil Rights Commission, since that commission's function
is investigative, not adjudicative. 44 Finally, not even the well-es-
tablished "political question" doctrine prevented the Court from
ordering a decision on the merits when a city, in restricting the
electorate for a municipal election, effectively zoned out practically
every Negro by enacting an ordinance which redefined the city's
boundaries into a peculiar 28-sided figure.45 Thus, not only the
provisions of the Constitution but also the trend in the Supreme
Court supports anti-literacy test proposals.
this Court has acted upon its view of the merits of the claim.
Id. at 716.
41. Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,
52 (1960).
42. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. The Supreme Court has consistently applied the concept of state
action to outlaw almost any attempt to disfranchise the Negro through
the use of white primaries. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
44. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
45. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See Comment, 61CoLUm. L. REv. 704 (1961).
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